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This paper estimates a structured life cycle model of family retirement decision using a 
unique historical dataset back simulated from Living in Ireland survey. Our model takes the 
advantages of the dataset and models retirement decisions in terms of monetary and leisure 
incentives, which reflect the complex welfare system in Ireland. The household extension 
version of the model adapts a collective modelling approach, where the intra-household 
bargaining is considered. We further incorporate complimentary leisure, which allows us to 
analyse the interactions of spouses’ retirement timing. This methodology enables us to 
capture the dynamics of retirement and tax-benefit policies and can be used to simulate the 
effect of policy reform on household retirement behaviours. The paper, in addition, applies 
the model to assess individual budgetary implications and the labour market impact of rising 
the minimum retirement age. Our simulation shows that increasing the minimum age for state 
pension entitlement to 70 would only delay the retirement by less than 2 years according to 
the individual based model. When we consider the intra-household bargaining and the higher 
preference of leisure found in the dual career households, the effect of postponing retirement 
further declines. The result suggests barely postponing the minimum retirement age for state 
pension without redefining the occupation and private pension rules will only have limited 
impact for household retirement behaviour in Ireland. 
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retirement choice models. I.  INTRODUCTION 
With many countries around the world facing rapidly ageing demographics, great attention has been 
paid to the economics of retirement. Population ageing in most developed countries is expected to 
produce significant public expenditure problems as the cost of public transfers such as pensions, 
health care and long-term care increases. It is important to understand, not only the immediate effect 
of retirement policy reforms in terms of fiscal sustainability, but more importantly, the change of 
retirement behaviour induced by the reforms needs to be understood. 
Retirement behaviour modelling is one of the fields that have been continuously developed over the 
past two decades and various methods have been employed to model the labour supply behaviour of 
elderly workers. One of the oldest methods is the reduced form model, where social and economic 
variables of individuals are used to estimate their time of retirement. This model, although convenient 
for estimating, cannot be used in policy simulation since no aspects of a policy are incorporated into 
the model, i.e. it assumes a policy to remains stable. In addition, reduced form models are not very 
successful in explaining the spikes observed in the retirement age distribution. Another popular model, 
the option value model which was originally suggested by Stock and Wise (1988, 1990), utilises a 
structural retirement decision model that is characterised by employing utility functions to optimize 
the retirement decision over the lifetime of a worker (MacDonald, 2006). Previous literature suggests 
that this model performs well in predicting the behaviour of individuals as it incorporates financial 
incentives. Although the model is straightforward, the empirical estimation may sometimes be 
difficult and only a few authors have succeeded in estimating a fully-fledged option value model 
(Euwals, 2006). Models such as dynamic programming models (e.g. Burkhauser et al., 2004), further 
incorporate the dynamics of choices over time. However, these models tend to need highly complex 
computation without offering a better predictive power when compared with the option value 
approach (Lumsdaine et al., 1992; Burkhauser et al., 2004). 
Option value models are typically individual based, which means that the heterogeneity of the 
household types is largely ignored. This may lead to issues with regard to individuals who do not live 
in a single person household. In addition, many countries including Ireland, evaluate tax and welfare 
benefits based on the total income of the household rather than individual income. Furthermore, a few 
studies have suggested that there is a correlation between spouses’ retirement timing (e.g. Maestas, 
2001; Gustman, 2000), as a large proportion of spouses are found to retire within a few years of each 
other. This was observed in the LII dataset, where more than 60% of the married couples retired 
within 5 years of each other. The existing reduced form analyses of couples’ retirement suggest that 
this is partly due to complementarities in spouses’ tastes for leisure activities, which are present when 
one or both partners enjoy retirement (Coile, 2000; Banks et al., 2007). 
Joint retirement choices models first appeared in 1990 when Hurd (1990) reviewed the joint 
retirement decision of husbands and wives and later efforts have improved the modelling (Casanova, 
2009). More recent versions of the model have incorporated family factors and have been proven to 
be useful for dual career households (Gustman, 2000). Different theoretical models have been 
developed for household based modelling and the oldest approach is the unitary model developed by 
Mincer (1963) and used by Becker (1965) and others. The unitary model treats a household as a single 
individual and assumes that the Slutsky matrix must be symmetrical. This assumption implies that the 
marginal compensated wage changes of the two partners must have the same effect on each other’s 
labour supply (van Klaveren et al., 2008). However, this approach is often criticized in the literature, 
due to the strict assumptions imposed, and many papers have refuted this assumption when using 
empirical data (Thomas, 1990; Browning et al., 1994; Blundell et al., 2007). Another method used to model household behaviour is called the collective approach. This was 
initially introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992, 1997) and later used by Apps and Rees (1988, 1997). 
The collective modelling approach assumes that the household decision processes should result in a 
Pareto-efficient intra-household allocation. Compared with the unitary approach, the assumption in 
the collective modelling approach seems to be more difficult to reject when tested on an empirical 
dataset (Cherchye et al., 2009, 2011). To date, there have only been a few papers published on the 
collective retirement choice model (Michaud and Vermeulen, 2010); however, due to dataset 
limitations and the limitations of the model, few have considered the comprehensive welfare benefits 
and DC pensions to which individuals may be entitled to. Other papers have used non-cooperative 
(strategic) models to analyse household behaviours (Jia, 2003; Chiappori and Donni, 2006). This type 
of model typically assumes that the outcome of household bargaining results in a Nash or Stackelberg 
equilibrium. However, this model is less popular due to its complexity and the difficulties in 
identification. 
There are a number of limitations to the existing implementations of household based retirement 
choice models for policy analysis. Due to the restriction on the model specification calculation and 
numeric calculation, many models are estimated via approximations, and certain numeric calculations 
are not feasible for future simulations. Additionally, the construction of social security wealth are 
typically approximated by a time-series function and combined with some synthetic old age benefits 
calculations. The heterogeneity of households and the receipt of other social benefits are largely 
ignored in almost all studies due to dataset limitations and calculation complexity. Finally, with more 
countries having engaged in pension reform over the recent decades and the gradual move towards 
DC pension plans, models need to be refined to adopt mixed pension plans within the same dataset.  
This paper uses a lifetime discrete choice framework that is in line with the random utility approach. 
It adopts the collective modelling approach with a household extension to provide increased pension 
information and estimates a structured model using a unique historical dataset back simulated from 
the LII survey (Li and O’Donoghue, 2010). The model takes advantages of the dataset and models the 
retirement decision in terms of the monetary and leisure incentives, which in turn reflects the 
complicated Irish welfare system. The household extension version of the model adapts the collective 
modelling approach allowing intra-household bargaining to be considered. This methodology allows 
the capture of the dynamics of pension and tax-benefit policies, and can be used to simulate the effect 
of policy reform on household retirement behaviours. 
Section 2 covers the background of the Irish pension system and theoretical models are described in 
section 3. Empirical specifications are presented in section 4, section 5 describes the dataset and 
section 6 reports the estimation results. Section 7 applies the model to the analysis of a synthetic 
pension reform of raising the minimum state pension entitlement age.  
II.  THE BACKGROUND OF IRISH PENSION SYSTEM 
As discussed in detail in the previous paper the Irish tax-benefit system is in many respects similar to 
the UK welfare state. Many welfare benefits in Ireland are flat rate based, and not earnings related 
(Evans et al., 2000; Callan, 1997) and Ireland uses a set of means tests and eligibility conditions to 
cover contingencies such as unemployment, old age disability, lone parenthood etc. (O’Donoghue, 2003). The Irish pension system is frequently presented as a multi-pillar system and Table 1 provides 
an overview of the components of the relevant welfare benefits provided for the elderly in Ireland
1. 
Table 1 Irish Pension System 
1st Pillar  Old Age Non-Contributory Pension; 
Old Age Contributory Pension; 
Invalidity Pension; 
Widow, Widower ,Orphan and other Pensions Benefits 
2
nd Pillar  Public service pay-as-you-go schemes; 
Funded occupational pension schemes set up by employers 
3
rd Pillar  Supplementary private pensions arranged by individuals 
 
Ireland has no single fixed retirement age and this varies depending on occupation and job sector. 
However, the system provides an incentive for all to retire at age 65/66 regardless of which 
individuals are employed in. This age has been confirmed by the synthetic analysis undertaken by Li 
and O’Donoghue (2011) where it has been shown that the replacement rate for all workers jumps 
when they become entitled to receive the public state pension.  
Since receiving certain old age benefits (e.g., old age contributory pension) in Ireland does not 
necessarily mean that an individual is out of the labour market, a more strict definition of retirement 
has been used in this study. Here, it is defined as an individual who has stopped working or receiving 
unemployment benefit after the age of 55 and who does not then re-enter the labour market.  
III.  THEORETICAL MODEL 
Although many pension policy analysis models use a reduced form model, this cannot be used for 
policy simulation for obvious reasons. First, this model assumes everything to be stable and second, a 
model is needed that can replicate real life scenarios, which means including all public pensions and 
private pensions, regardless of whether they are in the form of defined benefit (DB) or DC. Reduced 
form analysis tends to struggle to explain spikes observed in the retirement age distribution, and can 
only explain the age-65 spike with limited success. This section presents a fully structured model for 
analysing the retirement choices within a household.  
The Incentive of Retirement  
In order to model the retirement decisions within a household, the retirement incentives must be first 
understood. Economically speaking, one of the largest incentives of retirement comes from the 
financial perspective. Pension income is an important source of retirement for most of the elderly 
population. In Ireland, 59.5% of individuals receive a public or private pension after retirement, and 
pensions account for 71.6% of the total pre-tax income among those aged 65 or above. Li and 
O’Donoghue (2011) found that there is a link between the replacement rate and the retirement hazard 
rate when using the LII dataset. 
                                                      
1 This section aims to give a brief description of the current Irish pension system. For a detailed description of 
the tax benefit system in Ireland and its pension system, please refer to O’Donoghue (2003); Baroni & 
O’Donoghue (2009) Besides the strong financial incentives for retirement, leisure is also a critical component in an 
individual’s retirement choice. As would be assumed, leisure contributes positively to an individual’s 
utility function, just the same as monetary incentives. In a household setting, the utility of leisure is 
more complex as it might also be dependent on the spouse’s status, as a couple may prefer to spend 
time together. Casanova (2009) reported a correlation of the timing of couples’ retirement and 
suggested that this is due to the complementarity of spouses’ tastes for leisure, which are present 
when one or both partners enjoy retirement. 
Base Model Function 
In this paper, a structured life-cycle retirement choice model is described. The model utilises a 
discrete choice framework (as in Van Soest, 1995; Flood et al., 2004; Michaud and Vermeulen, 2010), 
which allows the incorporation of a complex non-linear tax benefit system. When determining 
whether to retire at a particular age τ, the worker seeks to maximise his/her utility among all possible 
retirement ages. Initially the model is individually based and it is assumed that an individual’s lifetime 
utility is constructed of two additive components, the utility from lifetime consumption ( C Σ ) and the 
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Where  ( ) v ⋅   denotes the utility from consumption and the  ( ) v ⋅   the utility from leisure. 
s δ  is  the 





 , where γ is the interest rate. 
In this model it is assumed that either retirement or labour market activity can occur at a particular 
point but not at the same time. Lifetime consumption is assumed to the same as lifetime earnings, 
while lifetime leisure is captured by the number of years that are free of labour market activities. For 
each time period there may be multiple income sources, including wages, non-labour income, benefit 
from the state if eligible and tax deducted accordingly. Forced retirement is not considered within this 
model, as retirement is being viewed from the supply side only. Since the labour earnings, pensions 
and benefits would change with retirement time R, the total expected income at time t can be 
presented as:  
  ( )|
wage pension others benefits
tt t t tt yy y y t a x Y
τ τ ++ + =−  (2) 
The pension component of earnings is constituted of three sub-components; public pension, 
occupational pension, and private pension. From a life-cycle perspective, the total budget constraint 
for an individual can be expressed as:  
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The model assumes perfect capital markets (see Gustafsson, 2001; Apps and Rees 2010) where the 
budget constraint balances over the lifetime and resources can be saved or borrowed from the future. Retirement Model with Household Extension 
As discussed earlier, the individual based model is unable to accurately model the monetary 
incentives for married couples due to the nature of tax benefit systems. In addition, all household 
interactions are also ignored. In order to address these two shortcomings, the model was extended to a 
household setting, which allows spouses to influence each other’s decision. 
Similar to the individual based model, it was assumed that an individual is rational and chooses to 
retire at a point which maximizes his/her lifetime utility. The observed pattern of retirements in a 
household is the result of two maximized utilities. To model this, the collective approach was used 
due to the simplicity of the modelling whilst also taking into account household bargaining. The 
model describes a household i ’s behaviour as an outcome of maximizing a household’s utility 
function: 
  ( ) ,,
, 1
mf f m
ii i mi i f UU U
τ τ τ τ ππ =+ −      (4) 
The individual preferences are represented by  ,
m
im U
τ  for male and  ,
f
if U
τ for female and the utility weight 
is presented by a Pareto parameter i πwhich is between 0 and 1. Browning et al. (2006) argued that the 
model is equivalent to the standard unitary model unless the Pareto parameter is dependent on prices. 
Following the weight modelling approaches used by van Klaveren (2008) and Michaud and 
Vermeulen (2010) etc., it was assumed that  i π varies across households as a function of potential 
wages. Empirically, the logarithm of the ratio of the male earnings and the female earnings was used 
as the key variable to model the Pareto weights. Personal characteristics (e.g. education) are assumed 
to be fully reflected in the potential earning profile. As the parameter always needs to fall between 
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Where  () N ⋅ stands for the standard normal distribution function. As a result,  i πis always bounded 
within 0 and 1.  i y is the potential earning of a household member if he/she works full time for one 
year in the labour market. An increase in i π implies that the male’s utility is weighted more heavily 
than the female’s within that household. The bargaining power is assumed to be even when the 
potential wage rate is same (
mf
ii yy = ). By design the weight is symmetrical. 
Since only the public consumption information is available for the LII dataset, the weights used in the 
dataset could not be identified directly, as discussed by Chiappori and Ekeland (2009). Over recent 
years, there have been several approaches developed for this estimation, including using leisure as 
exclusive goods (Van Klaveren et al., 2008) or assuming that widows have the same preference as 
individuals within the household setting (Michaud and Vermeulen, 2009). However, neither method is 
appropriate in this particular study because here it is the complementary leisure effect that is being 
specifically modelled, which makes leisure a public goods by design. Additionally, there are only a 
very limited number of widows entering retirement in the LII dataset and their identification would 
therefore be difficult or unreliable. As a result, the µ parameter was fixed according to the values 
obtained in the previous literature (Browning, 2006; Michaud and Vermeulen, 2009). Given the wide range of µ estimates found, 5 scenarios were considered in order to cover a large range of potential 
values, and µ was set at 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5
2.  
In order to adapt the utility function to a household setting and incorporate some interactions within a 
household, the base individual utility function (1) was extended. In the household model, it was 
assumed that all consumptions within the household were public and the preferences of each member 
allowed for the externalities of the spouse’s utility. In addition, following the findings of the literature 
(Coile, 2000) on the correlation of retirement timing between spouses, a complementary utility of 
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Where  i t
τ   represents the timing of an individual, i ’s retirement.  ( ) p ⋅   is the complimentary utility 
which is only present when the spouse retires at the same time. Individuals without spouses, naturally 
have a zero complimentary utility, as presented in the individual based model. Accordingly, the 
budget constraint of the model is also extended to include the sum of two individuals’ income and 
benefits that the household is eligible for.  
IV.  EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
In order to estimate the models above, it is necessary to transform them into models that can be 
estimated numerically, and a logarithmic function was used to specify the consumption function  ( ) v ⋅  
and also the leisure functions () u ⋅ , ( ) p ⋅ . Given the complexity of modelling leisure, an age-leisure 
interaction was added to capture the shift in leisure taste over time. Additionally, health status ( H ) 
was also incorporated to refine the estimation of leisure. The health variable is defined as the number 
of expected years that an individual may stay healthy without suffering a major chronic illness from 
the age of 55 onwards. Complementary leisure is reflected via a dummy variable , is d , which is equal 
to zero if the spouse is not retired or the individual does not have a spouse. As a result, the statistical 
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   (7) 
Consequently, the collective household utility function becomes: 
                                                      
2 Although these five alternatives may seem to have very different Pareto weight parameters, this was found to 
have no significant impact on the final estimation results.  
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Given the discrete choice setting, there are 21 possible choices of retirement, i.e. between the ages of 
55 to 75, for the individual based model and 441 (21
2) possible choices of retirement for a married 
couple. Pareto parameters were estimated independently using the assumptions listed earlier. 
As mentioned earlier, accumulated earnings were used as a proxy for lifetime consumption. Since the 
pre-55 earnings do not vary across different choices, only the sum of expected earnings from age 55 
onwards were used as the consumption variable in practise. The wage of the individual positively 
depends upon the human capital accumulation from their job experience (h ), school ( s ) and market 
rental rate of human capital ω at time t . As the rate of return to experience falls with experience, the 
square of experiences was incorporated with a negative coefficient to produce a typical age-earning 
profile. The model incorporates the assumption that human capital depreciates during periods out of 
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Since there is no partial retirement scheme in Ireland, it was assumed that the fluctuations in terms of 
working hours were minimal for elderly workers and thus the labour supply effects could be ignored. 
The differences for working hours per individual can be captured by the individual persistent 
component of the salary. In addition, economic instability was incorporated into the model through 
the inclusion of the expected unemployment rate at each time t. Hence, the expected wage earnings 
were  (1 )
wage
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Assuming vector  , ij τ represents the choice set that a male retires at time i, and a female retires at time 
j, the revealed preference 
*
*, * ij τ achieves the highest level of utility for both household members, when 
the household utility reaches its peak. Assuming the disturbances are i.i.d. with a Gumbell (type 1 
extreme value) distribution, the model could be estimated using a discrete choice framework with a 























     (11) 
Based on the model presented, the key determinants of retirement postponement and the basic 
assumptions underpinning the motivations influencing an individual’s retirement decision can be 
listed. If 
(1 , ) ij Y
τ + ∆  is used to denote the difference in total income due to the shift of retirement timing 
from i  to  1 i + , and  i dw  the working status of an individual at time i , if there is no change in the 
spouse’s retirement timing, then the cost of retirement at time i  as opposed to one year later for a 
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•  The utility cost from household earnings changes. This includes the change of labour income, 
pension entitlement, and household benefits 
•  The utility cost from leisure due to the change in leisure stream and age 
•  The potential change in complimentary leisure due to the change of retirement age 
•  Change in the health variable, depending on the health situation of the individual at time i 
In addition, the cost of retirement includes the change in human capital, which is modelled through 
wage equations. Since re-entering the labour market around the moment of retirement in not 
considered in this model, the change in human capital is only reflected in the gradual increase of 
earnings if an individual remains in work.  
As seen from the decomposition, there are several factors affecting the retirement decision. The 
greater the cost of retirement in the future, the earlier retirement would occur. Pension plan changes 
and labour earnings changes affect an individual’s retirement decision through item A, while the 
leisure term B is mostly unaffected except by life expectancy. Individuals with lower earnings tend to 
have lower costs through A; however, the cost may increase faster than average due to the incremental 
growth of the limited human capital. As a result, this group may tend to retire earlier, which is 
consistent with the empirical findings presented by Li and O’Donoghue (2011). 
The age-gap present in a household also influences the household’s retirement decision through item 
C, as spouses may retire earlier or later. In the case where a spouse retires early than i, then there is no 
loss in the complimentary utility. However, this will affect the cost of retirement if two spouses’ 
choose to retire close together, as observed in real life. The retirement decision could also be affected 
by a change of health (item D). This suggests that those who are affected most by health are those with deteriorating health rather than those with persistent lifetime illnesses as it is only the change that 
matters. When using the dataset from LII, no consistent pattern for health could be determined across 
groups with different retirement ages (Li and O’Donoghue, 2011). Last but not the least, the Pareto 
weight  h π  decides the intra-household allocation of consumption, which also affects an individual’s 
retirement decision. While equation (12) only presents the cost of retirement for males, the cost for 
females follows the same structure since the model is symmetrical. For a single person household 
(individual model), item C is always equals to zero, while  h π remains constant. 
From the decomposition of retirement cost, the signs of the coefficients can in theory be predicted. It 
would normally be expected that utility from consumption is positive, together with the utility from 
leisure. In addition, since leisure would normally increase in value when getting older, a positive 
coefficient for the age-leisure interaction would also be expected. 
V.  DATASET  
To estimate the model described above, it is necessary to use a dataset which records the social 
economic variables, earnings and pension profile between age 55-75. This type of dataset, however, is 
not readily available in Ireland as the comprehensive household survey datasets only covers a limited 
number of waves. Therefore, this paper uses a simulated long panel dataset derived from the LII 
longitudinal survey was used. The data covers a wide range of aspects regarding the life of an 
individual, but does not cover the complete career trajectory needed for pension and retirement 
modelling. In order to meet the requirements of the model, the historical labour market profile for 
individuals in the LII dataset were back simulated via a dynamic microsimulation in a reversed 
direction (Li and O’Donoghue, 2010). The simulated dataset matches the reported pension eligibilities, 
including state pension, occupational pension and private pension, with higher than 95% accuracy as 
presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 Percentage of Correctly Simulated Eligibility  
Pension Type  Correctly Simulated  Number of Observations* 
Contributory State Pension 96.08%  9343 
Occupational Pension  98.25%  10030 
Private Pension  97.36%  1706 (Year 2000 onwards) 
*Only age 66+ are included for state pension and 65+ for occupational and private pension 
 
With the extensive historical information and consistent benefit eligibilities, the monetary earnings of 
different retirement choices could be extracted and recreated. Retirement in this paper is defined as 
exiting the labour market after the age of 55. The retired population has two subsets, those who are 
officially “retired” and remain active, and those who become permanently inactive in the labour 
market after a certain age. An individual is considered to be “inactive” if  
•  They are aged 55 or above and state “not working” as their main economic activity that year  
•  Does not receive unemployment beneﬁt, since this indicates that the individual is still actively 
seeking employment  
•  Their labour income, which could come from the transition period, is less than 50% of their life 
average earning level  
 It was assumed that an individual retires between the age 55 and 75 as this is the main group of 
retirees present in Ireland. Individuals who retired outside of this range were excluded. Married 
individuals between the ages of 55 to 75 who made a transition to retirement within the dataset were 
selected for inclusion in the model. In order to ensure the quality of the simulated labour market 
profile, only individuals who worked at least 3 years in the 10 year period prior to retirement were 
included in the estimations. 
































Summary Statistics on Key Variables 
Since each individual is exposed to 21 choices (from age 55 to age 75), the total number of choices
3 a 
household can make is 441 (21
2). A dynamic microsimulation model was used to assist in the 
calculation of incomes for different retirement scenarios. This calculation retained the household 
structure of the simulated household, i.e., everyone in the household was simulated throughout the 
entire time period unless death occurred. The dynamic microsimulation model includes a complex 
pool of equations which were estimated for the LII dataset. These cover the labour supply module, 
earning module, state pension entitlement module, occupational pension module and private pension 
module. With a rich pool of data simulated from the model, income, leisure, and social economics 
characteristics could be calculated for all the scenarios. 
Table 3 Summary of Variables on Estimated Sample  
Variables Cases 
Total Number of Individuals     390 
 Male    298 
 Female    92 




Chronic Illness at the time of retirement     10.3% 
Married   79.2% 
                                                      
3 Not all choices may be present due to life expectancy restrictions. Was in public sector (if working)     17.5% 
Average retirement age     63.65 
Number of Observations  8190 
VI.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Individual Model 
Estimations were made for both the individual and household based models. While the individual 
based model was estimated for all retirees, the household based model was only applicable for a dual 
career household exhibiting a stable marriage. Males and females were estimated separately as they 
may be subject to very different employment histories and preferences. In addition, the potential 
differences in preferences between married and single retirees were also considered.  
Table 4 presents the estimation results from the individual based models. As would be expected, the 
lifetime income term is always positive and significant. Leisure is generally highly significant across 
the models when age-leisure interaction terms are considered at the same time. This positive 
interaction suggests that individuals value leisure more as they age. However, the coefficients are not 
the same across all models and differences are found between males and females, and married and 
single retirees, in terms of income and leisure coefficients. In general, females are more sensitive to 
both monetary income and leisure change. The leisure term coefficients for the female models are on 
a few occasions, higher than the male models. This may indicate that a female’s retirement decision is 
more influenced by leisure than a male’s retirement decision. It can also be seen that married retirees 
in general, are less sensitive to income and more sensitive to leisure than single retirees, a pattern that 
is repeated for both males and females. 
Within these estimations, health is not found to be significant, for which there may be several reasons. 
Firstly, the wage model utilised here is health dependent, which means that the lifetime income is 
already endogenous with the health variable. Secondly, the health variable, as introduced in the data 
section, is defined as the number of healthy years following retirement, a variable which as a result, is 
correlated with leisure, therefore, making the effect of the health variable less obvious. Thirdly, as 
discussed earlier in the theoretical section, only those individuals with worsening health situations are 
most likely to be affected and this may also affect the efficiencies of the estimations.  
Table 4 Estimation Results from Individual Models 

















28.36 25.33 25.64  94.41 39.99 44.94 
  (5.10) (2.02) (1.84)  (23.52) (6.87) (6.23) 
Leisure  6.86 7.21 6.66    17.31  27.22  20.04 
    (2.32) (1.12) (0.96)  (9.62) (6.21) (4.45) 
Leisure Age 
Interaction 
0.04 0.16 0.12    0.68 0.74 0.65 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.29)  0.17  (0.13) 
Health  -0.84 -0.45 -0.43  5.06  1.20  3.45 
  (0.87) (0.49) (0.43)  (5.16) (2.47) (2.13) Number of 
Observations 
1155 5103 6258   567  1365 1932 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
      
Household Model 
Before the estimation of collective models, the sharing rule must first be specified and in this study 
the Pareto weight was used. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of different sharing parameters on 
bargaining power. As indicated, males on average have higher bargaining powers due to their higher 
earning capacities. If the husband’s potential earning capacity is three times higher than his wife’s, the 
Pareto weight ranges from 0.54 when µ is 0.1, or 0.71 when µ is 0.5. This weighting is symmetrical 
between husband and wife. As can be seen, the higher the µ value, the higher the standard deviation 
found in the distribution of the Pareto weight π. When µ is very small, e.g. < 0.1, the model is closer 
to a unitary model. Due to the data limitations as discussed earlier, the µ parameter has been fixed in 
these estimations. However, the structure of the main model estimation is unaffected, as the Pareto 
weight is seen as an independent variable within the model. In the estimations, five scenarios are 
considered where µ ranges from 0.1 to 0.5.  
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Table 5 reports the results of the estimations from the collective model. As can be seen, the 
coefficients are very similar across all scenarios. The standard error of the estimation is much bigger 
than the differences between scenarios for all coefficients. Similarly to the individual models, income 
is found to be highly significant, although the numeric value of the coefficients falls considerably. The 
intercept terms of leisure are not significant except for females. Nonetheless, a highly significant age-
leisure interaction across all scenarios was demonstrated for both husbands and wives, which 
translates to a significant positive leisure effect overall as expected.  
In the collective model, complimentary leisure was incorporated as a key variable to interact between 
males and females utility. The result shows that the effect of a partner’s retirement status is highly 
significant for both males and females, a finding which is consistent with earlier literature reporting 
that spouses tend to retire very shortly after each other (Gustman and Stienmeir, 2000; Michaud, 
2005). Health was shown to be significant at the 10% level for females but insignificant for males. For both the individual model and collective model, females exhibited a higher preference towards leisure 
compared with males.  
Table 5 Estimation Results from Collective Model  
Scenario  1 Scenario  2 Scenario  3 Scenario  4 Scenario  5 
Variables 
(µ=0.1) (µ=0.2) (µ=0.3) (µ=0.4) (µ=0.5) 
Shared Variable       
    14.38 14.13 13.88 13.65 13.44 
 
Household Lifetime 
Income  (3.59) (3.61) (3.63) (3.65) (3.68) 
Husband       
    5.40 5.54 5.67 5.77 5.80 
  
Leisure 
(4.82) (4.55) (4.30) (4.08) (3.90) 
    0.51 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.40 
  
Leisure Age 
Interaction  (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) 
    0.70 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.77 
  
Complementary 
Leisure if spouse 
retired  (0.29) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) 
    0.77 0.68 0.62 0.59 0.58 
  
Health 
(2.08) (1.95) (1.83) (1.73) (1.65) 
Wife       
    18.89 18.67 18.40 18.12 17.82 
  
Leisure 
(8.51) (9.01) (9.55)  (10.11)  (10.67) 
    0.93 1.04 1.17 1.31 1.46 
  
Leisure Age 
Interaction  (0.29) (0.32) (0.35) (0.38) (0.41) 
    0.71 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.82 
  
Complementary 
Leisure if spouse 
retired  (0.32) (0.34) (0.36) (0.38) (0.39) 
    6.89 7.57 8.32 9.11 9.87 
  
Health 
(3.85) (4.13) (4.45) (4.78) (5.11) 
Number  of  Observations 19509 19509 19509 19509 19509 
 
Compared with individual models, collective model estimates seem to generally have lower 
coefficients for income and higher coefficients for leisure. This difference in coefficients may reveal 
differences in the preferences between different social groups. The individual models included all 
observations, while the household models only used dual career spouses. The difference in 
coefficients implies a heterogeneity of preferences among the population, and seem to suggest that 
people with families, especially working spouses, value leisure more than the single population. To 
eliminate the difference caused by the sampling procedure, the individual models were re-estimated 
using the same dataset as the collective model. As reported in Table 6, the differences found in the 
coefficients seemed now to be reduced, thus confirming the speculation that coefficients are heavily 
influenced by the sample; although the re-estimated coefficients for leisure are generally smaller than 
the equivalent terms in the collective model.  
Table 6 Estimation Results from Individual models using same dataset as collective model 
   Individual Model     Collective Model (µ=0.3) Variables Male  Female      Male  Female 
Lifetime Income  8.54  14.95  13.88 
  (2.73) (3.89)  (3.63) 
Leisure 3.28  13.58  5.67 18.40 
   (2.46)  (4.57)  (4.30) (9.55) 
Leisure Age Interaction  0.30  0.45  0.45 1.17 
  (0.10) (0.15)  (0.16) (0.35) 
Health 0.32  3.43  0.62 8.32 
 (1.07)  (2.05)  (1.83) (4.45) 
Number of Observations  942  932    19509  19509 
(standard errors in parentheses)           
 
Predictive Power of the Models 
As one of the main applications of the structured retirement choice model is to evaluate potential 
reforms, it is important to assess the fitness of the model. Figure 3 plots the difference between 
predicted retirement age and the actual retirement age. As can be seen, in the individual based model, 
76.7% of the observations have an error of less than 2 years and 94.6% of the observations fall within 
an error of 5 years.  



















In the collective model, the retirement choice is a vector of two retirement decisions. Consequently in 
Figure 4, the graph was plotted in a two-dimensional manner, with the x-axis illustrating the error of 
prediction of the husband’s retirement choice, and the y-axis the error of the wife’s retirement choice 
prediction. Since one error pattern may appear several times, the circles were weighted using the 
frequency of the error patterns. The larger the circle, the greater the number of households that fall 
into this pattern. Sharing rules did not seem to have any major impact on the predictive power. Figure 
5 plots the retirement age distribution under the five scenarios with different µ values. The resulting 
curves look very alike and the difference in terms of predicted retirement ages are on average, less 
than one year. Given that there is no statistical difference between coefficients with different µ 
parameters, the median value,  0.3 µ = , was chosen to validate the predictive power of the model. As shown, for 88.9% of the households the household choice was predicted with neither member of the 
household displaying an error larger than 5 years. Therefore, the model is able to predict the 
retirement choice for both a husband and wife with an average error of less than 2 years for 51.1% of 
the observations.  
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VII.  SIMULATION OF A REFORM SCENARIO 
One of the main advantages of a structured retirement model is that it can be used for policy 
simulation. As European countries are actively seeking to postpone the minimum full retirement age, 
the model presented in this paper offers opportunities for exploring the potential effect of raising the 
minimum retirement age. The reform scenario tested here, assumes a postponement of all state 
pension pay-outs until age 70, instead of the current age of 65/66 for both contributory and non-
contributory pensions. All other rules of the tax benefit system remain the same and occupation and private pension pay-outs are not affected by the change. This would result in a decreased income level 
between the ages of 65 and 70 due to the missing state pension. However, depending on the income 
level the effect might be different due to the progressive nature of the tax system. 
The simulation therefore recalculates the potential lifetime earnings and changes in welfare benefit 
entitlements, but does not change life expectancy, leisure, preferences or any other non-monetary 
variables. One potential problem of the scenario is the change of the unemployment rate. With the 
possibility of working until a later age, the employment rate of an elderly worker would increase as 
more people would have the opportunity of working if they so wished, e.g. public sector workers. As 
a result, using the existing unemployment rate may underestimate an individual’s expected income 
after the reform. Therefore, in order to control the potential change of the labour market structure, the 
risk of unemployment within the 5 years after the original individual retirement age is assumed to be 
the same as the risk immediately before retirement. The bargaining power within a household is 
assumed not to have been affected by the new pension rule and there are no changes in terms of 
eligibility. The reform is implemented as if all households in the dataset are subject to the new 
regulation at the time of retirement and the reform is simulated using both individual and household 
based models.  
Change in the Budget Constraint 
The direct consequence of the reform is a change in lifetime income, which is the result of several 
sources. First, abandoning the state pension between the ages of 65 to 70 decreases the earnings for 
those who retire before the age of 66. Second, the change of the unemployment rate increases the 
income level if individuals choose to continue working after their original retirement age. The reform 
makes later retirement more attractive as it increases the cost of retiring at the same age. In addition to 
the direct changes stated above, there is a third source of change. In the case of a household which has 
more than one family member, the change in the total income would affect the tax-benefit eligibility 
as well. As a result, there may be an extra household based benefit or heavier tax cost, depending on 
the household’s circumstances.  
Table 7 reports the change of the budget constraints in logarithmic term for the datasets. For the 
dataset that covers both singles and couples, the net change of the reform is negative if retirement 
occurs at an early age, although this turns positive when retiring at a later age. This is expected as the 
early retirees have lost their state pension before the age of 70, while late retirees are benefiting from 
the lower unemployment rate, which translates into a higher expected income. The trend is similar 
between mean and median values, although the effect is greater if presented through the mean because 
of the bias towards high income earners. The change in the budget constraint implies that there is a 
monetary incentive to retire later, although the effect might be limited given certain income brackets 
are more likely to be affected than the others.  
Table 7 Change of the Budget Constraint for the Simulated Reform  
   Individual Models (All observations)    Collective Models (only couples) 
 
Mean value of 
change 
 
Median value of 
change 
Mean value of 
change 




Male Female   Male  Female    Male Female   Male  Female 
55 -0.053 -0.034    -0.014  -0.005   -0.045  0.014  -0.012 -0.004 
56 -0.050 -0.031    -0.013  -0.005   -0.044  0.014  -0.012 -0.002 57 -0.047 -0.024    -0.011  -0.004   -0.044  0.015  -0.012 -0.001 
58 -0.042 -0.016    -0.009  -0.003   -0.043  0.016  -0.013 0.000 
59 -0.036 -0.007    -0.004  -0.002   -0.042  0.018  -0.012 0.000 
60 -0.023  0.003   -0.002  -0.002   -0.040  0.020  -0.011 0.000 
61 -0.009  0.008  0.000  -0.002   -0.033  0.020  -0.011 0.000 
62 0.006  0.016    0.000  -0.001   -0.026 0.019  -0.009 0.000 
63 0.025  0.027    0.000  0.000   -0.015 0.020  -0.004 0.000 
64 0.046  0.044    0.000  0.000   -0.009 0.021  -0.002 0.000 
65 0.070  0.061    0.013  0.004   0.003  0.021  0.000 0.001 
66 0.093  0.084    0.022  0.008   0.018  0.020  -0.003 -0.007 
67 0.104  0.085    0.019  0.001   0.033  0.013  -0.007 -0.018 
68 0.111  0.081    0.017  -0.009   0.042  0.002  -0.007 -0.028 
69 0.114  0.084    0.008  -0.013   0.050 -0.010  -0.004 -0.039 
70 0.108  0.090    -0.003  -0.022   0.050 -0.017  -0.014 -0.043 
71 0.117  0.109    0.007  -0.010   0.054 -0.012  -0.015 -0.043 
72 0.124  0.113    0.011  -0.010   0.056 -0.013  -0.013 -0.047 
73 0.133  0.117    0.016  -0.010   0.062 -0.011  -0.012 -0.048 
74 0.141  0.121    0.024  0.002   0.065 -0.009  -0.010 -0.046 
75 0.150  0.124    0.041  0.003   0.071 -0.008    -0.005  -0.044 
N.B. change is defined as ln(y*/y), collective model reports the budget change at household level 
 
For the collective model, the pattern is more complicated due to the consideration of both dimensions, 
i.e. husband and wife. As a result, Table 7 only reflects the average changes in the household budget 
due to the reform. The budget change at the different retirement age for males follows a similar 
pattern as in the individual models, but for females, the reform causes a declining budget constraint at 
a later age rather than increasing trend. This is due to the fact that within the dataset, very few females 
retire later and in addition, female earnings have a lower impact on average on the household budget. 
It is possible that under certain circumstances, the loss of the state pension outweighs the potential 
gains of postponing retirement. To further illustrate the complex interaction of incomes, tax benefits 
and retirement ages, a heat map was plotted for the dataset containing couples. As can be seen in 
Figure 6, the general pattern shows that a household can benefit from the reform if both the husband 
and wife retire later. When combining the results from Table 7 and Figure 6, it would be expected that 
the reform on average, would affect males more than females due to a higher change in the budget 
constraint. Comparing the individual models and the household models, it would be expected that 
couples would be less affected by the reform due to the smoothing effect of multiple income sources, 


























Result from the Individual Based Model 
Simulating pension reform using individual based models requires some extra assumptions. As the 
original model is estimated on the condition that the spouse retirement timing is fixed, this implies 
that all choices are independent within the simulation, no matter how a household is structured. To 
illustrate the effect of the reform, a hazard graph of retirement for males and females was plotted 
separately (Figure 7). The solid line represents the percentage of people who retired at a certain age, 
while the dashed line shows the equivalent percentage following a rise in the minimum retirement age. 
As can be seen, the increase of the minimum state pension entitlement age would change the 
retirement pattern for both males and females and on average, the retirement age is postponed by 1.91 
years for males and 1.80 years for females.  










 Result from the Collective Model 
Since the sharing rules do not affect the predictive power of the model significantly, the median value 
of 0.3 was continued to be used as the sharing rule parameter. In the household setting, where 
consumption is public and complimentary leisure is dependent on the retirement status of the spouse, 
the simulation result differs from that exhibited in the individual model. Compared with the 
simulation results from the pure individual models estimated earlier, the household model based 
simulation suggests that on average, males and females postpone their retirement by 0.5~0.6 years. As 
can be seen in Figure 8, the density of retirement for males around 65 is now reduced. However, the 
hazard rate of retirement does not alter significantly before the age of 60 or after the age of 70. As far 
as females are concerned, the number of individuals who retire at a very early age, i.e. around 55, has 
declined, but the hazard rate after the age of 60 does not change significantly. 
Compared with the simulation results from the earlier individual models, the effect of reform seems to 
be smaller and this is consistent with what the budget constraint indicates. The change to the 
household budget constraint is smaller than the change to the individual budget constraint, as 
presented in Table  In addition, individual models and collective models are estimated on two 
different samples which have very different preferences for money and leisure. In order to isolate the 
effect of the model differences, the individual based simulation model was also run in order to 
compare the results. The result from the individual based models using the household model dataset is 
represented by the long dashed line in Figure 8. This new simulation suggests that the result from the 
individual model is very close to the result from the collective model, although it seems to have a 
slightly larger effect, 0.1~0.2 years extra. The differences between the models are mainly due to the 
calculation of tax-benefits and the interactions within a household. Complimentary leisure could 
potentially reduce the effectiveness of the reform as delaying retirement may reduce the total welfare 
of the household, depending on the time of the spouse’s retirement. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This paper presented a structural retirement choice model to analyse the labour supply behaviour of 
elderly workers which is line with the random utility approach used by Van Soest (1995). The model explicitly incorporated the personal labour trajectory, DB/DC pension entitlements, detailed 
retirement regulations and the tax benefit system. Two variations of the model were presented, one 
which is individual based and another which is a collective household model, in which different 
preferences and bargaining are explicitly allowed in order to reach the observed household allocations. 
The intra-household allocations were assumed to be Pareto efficient as in the typical collective models 
suggested by Chiappori (1988, 1992). Complimentary leisure was incorporated into the model, 
thereby allowing further analysis of the interactions of spouses’ retirement timing as previously found 
in the literature (Maestas, 2001; Gustman, 2000). 
This paper used a unique historical dataset that has been extensively enriched based on an eight-wave 
Irish survey dataset using the method described by Li and O’Donoghue (2010). Most parameters from 
the models were found to be significant and matched our initial expectations. It was found that 
individuals positively valued leisure and income as expected, and a gradual increase in leisure 
preference was observed for all individual ages. In the collective household model, complimentary 
leisure was found to be highly significant, suggesting that the retirement decision is dependent on a 
spouse’s choices. No significant effect of health was found. The health variable was defined as the 
number of healthy labour free years, which by the definition used in this study is correlated with 
earnings and leisure. Both individual and collective models were tested to validate their predictive 
power. The results suggest that the models are able to replicate most retirement choices with an error 
of less than 2 years.  
Additionally, this paper also simulated a potential state pension reform. A scenario was envisaged 
whereby the minimum age for claiming the Irish state pension was raised from 65 to 70. This reform, 
the simulation suggested, delays the average retirement age. However, the collective model result 
differed from the individual model result. The simulation based on the individual model suggested 
that elderly workers would postpone their retirement by about 1.8~1.9 years on average, while the 
collective model suggested that the effect was only around 0.5~0.6 years.  
The differences between the models were largely due to differences in monetary structure and leisure 
preferences between dual career household members and the general population. Additionally, the 
pension reform had a smaller impact on the household budget of dual-career households than for 
single career households. When using the same dataset, most differences in terms of retirement age 
distribution were dramatically reduced. Furthermore, the calculation of welfare benefits and family 
interactions also contributed to the differences observed. The tax-benefit system in Ireland is 
household-based, and the individual-based model did not take into account the effect of regulation 
change on other household members. Additionally, the existence of the complimentary leisure term in 
the collective model also acted as a barrier if an individual decided to postpone retirement beyond the 
year of their spouse’s retirement. This finding suggests that dual-career households have very 
different leisure preferences compared with single retirees. As a result, a simulation exercise based 
purely on the individual model may distort the reform effect for dual career households. Combining 
all of the results presented, a tentative conclusion can be reached that by raising only the minimum 
retirement age for state pension without changing any other regulations does delay retirement but the 
effect is probably smaller than may have been expected.  
It should also be noted that the models presented in this paper also have their drawbacks. First, the 
model is estimated based on an expanded household survey dataset which does not contains as many 
observations as would be present in a national administrative dataset. However, the household survey 
dataset does provide some important accurate information that an administrative dataset may not 
provide e.g. information on education. Second, the model assumes that individuals are rational but does not allow changes in family formation. These assumptions may not hold in real life where the 
dynamics of the life expectancy, income, and family formation are typically much more complex. 
Future research could incorporate more uncertainties and dynamics into the model to account for 
these limitations. Finally, since the bargaining parameters cannot be fully identified using the 
available dataset, the model was estimated using a wide range of potential parameters and median 
values for the simulation exercise. The results show that the model estimates are robust across all 
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